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AVOIDING THE ANTI-INJUNCTION STATUTE IN SUITS
TO ENJOIN TERMINATION OF TAX-EXEMPT STATUS
The interest of the government in efficient tax collection traditionally
has resulted in rigid enforcement of assessment and collection proce-
dures.1 A policy which postpones litigation until a taxpayer's liability
has been assessed enhances the flow of revenue into government coffers.2
As one court has observed, "the general principle has long prevailed un-
changed that the Government is not to be balked in its tax collection by
taxpayers' litigation, for this would threaten its continued operation and
might even endanger its very existence." 3
Judicial interference in tax matters was first restrained by application
of the equitable principle that injunctive relief cannot be granted unless
the plaintiff establishes that his legal remedies are clearly inadequate.4 In
1867, Congress recognized the policy against judicial interference by
prohibiting taxpayer injunction suits.5 The original anti-injunction stat-
1. See, e.g., Cheatham v. United States, 92 U.S. 85, 88 (1875). See also Lenoir, Con-
gressional Control Over Suits to Restrain the Assessment or Collection of Federal Taxes,
3 Aiuz. L.REV. 177 (1961).
2. A taxpayer has two procedures through which he may litigate a disputed tax. Upon
receipt of a notice of deficiency, he may bring suit in the Tax Court without first
paying the tax assessed against him. Alternatively, he may pay the tax and, upon making
a claim for overpayment, sue for a refund in either a federal district court or the Court
of Claims. Jury trial and the powers of equity are available only in a refund suit, there-
by enhancing the desirability of that remedy. See J. CHOMMIE, FEDERAL INcomE TAXATioN
§§ 252-59 (1968); Mills, Remedy Problems in Federal Civil Tax Litigation, 5 Asuz. L. REV.
32 (1963).
3. Quinn v. Hook, 231 F. Supp. 718, 719 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
4. Note, Enjoining the Assessment and Collection of Federal Taxes Despite Statutory
Prohibition, 49 HAR. L. REv. 109 (1935).
5. Internal Revenue Act of 1866, ch. 184, § 19, 14 Star. 152.
It has been said that the legislative history of the anti-injunction statute is "shrouded
in darkness." Note, Enjoining the Assessment and Collection of Federal Taxes Despite
Statutory Prohibition, 49 HARV. L. REv. 109 (1935). The Supreme Court, however, has
examined the purpose of the Act on several occasions. For example, in Cheatham v.
United States, 92 U.S. 85 (1875), the Court stated: "If there existed in the courts,
State or National, any general power of impeding or controlling the collection of taxes,
or relieving the hardship incident to taxation, the very existence of the government
might be placed in the power of a hostile judiciary." Id. at 89. In the State Railroad Tax
Cases, 92 U.S. 575 (1875), the Court observed:
[Section 7421(a)] shows the sense of Congress of the evils to be feared
if courts of. justice could, in any case, interfere with the process of collect-
ing the taxes on which the government depends for its continued ex-
istence. . . . It is founded in the simple philosophy derived from the ex-
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ute, the constitutionality of which was upheld soon after its enactment, 6
was modified intermittently; however, its essential provisions remain
unchanged and are included in section 7421 (a) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954. The present version of the statute provides that, with
certain exceptions,7 "no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment
or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any person,
whether or not such person is the person against whom such tax was
assessed." 8
Although section 7421(a) appears unequivocal in its prohibitions, it
has been held not to bar all suits for injunctive relief. Two recent fed-
eral appellate decisions illustrate various approaches which may be taken
by taxpayers seeldng to enjoin Internal Revenue Service action, not-
withstanding the existence of the and-injunction statute. Both Bob Jones
University v. Connally9 and Americans United, Inc. v. Walters'0 in-
volved non-profit organizations whose existence depended upon charit-
perience of ages, that the payment of taxes had to be enforced by summary
and stringent means against a reluctant and often adverse sentiment; and
to do this successfully, other instrumentalities and other modes of procedure
are necessary, than those which belong to courts of justice.
/d. at 613-14.
6. Pullam v. Kinsinger, 20 F. Cas. 44 (No. 11,463) (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1870).
7. These exceptions include INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 6212(a),(c), 6213(a), which
permit suits in the Tax Court to litigate the legality and correctness of deficiency as-
sessments, and INr. REv. CoDE OF 1954, §§ 7426(a),(b), which relate to foreclosure pro-
ceedings and judicial sales of property on which the United States has a tax lien.
8. INT. REv. CoDE oF 1954, § 7421(a). The procedural effect of the statute is to deprive
the courts of jurisdiction of cases in which it is sought to enjoin the assessment or col-
lection of a tax.
The Declaratory Judgment Act provides in pertinent part: "In a case of actual con-
troversy within its jurisdiction, except ith respect to Federal taxes, any court of the
United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and
other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not
further relief is or could be sought.. . ." 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1970) (emphasis supplied).
There has been dispute whether the exclusion of tax cases from the Declaratory Judg-
ment Act is subject to the same equitable considerations which have created exceptions
to section 7421(a). Several decisions have held the prohibition against declaratory judg-
ments in tax cases absolute. See, e.g., Martin v. Andrews, 238 F.2d 552 (9th Cir. 1956);
Red Star Yeast & Products Co. v. LaBudde, 83 F.2d 394 (7th Cir. 1936). However, the
Supreme Court appears to have rejected this position. See, e.g., Samuels v. Mackell, 401
U.S. 66 (1971); Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293 (1943). Al-
though the focus of this Comment will be upon section 7421(a), the analysis will be
applicable as well to the Declaratory Judgment Act.
9. No. 72-1075 (4th Cir., Jan. 19, 1973).
10. No. 71-1299 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 11, 1973).
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able contributions. Each organization sought to enjoin the official revoca-
tion of its tax-exempt status under section 501 (c) (3) of the Code.1'
Bob Jones University is a religiously oriented educational institution
which admittedly practiced racial discrimination in its admissions policy.
The Treasury's threatened action was based upon a policy ruling which
withdrew tax-exempt status from schools which discriminated on the
basis of race. Americans United, Inc. is an organization formed for the
purpose of fostering the principles of separation of church and state.
The government claimed that since a substantial part of the corporation's
activities involved political lobbying, the organization was no longer
entitled to the exemption. 12
There is an important distinction between the cases; although both
organizations claimed tax-exempt status under section 501 (c) (3), Amer-
icans United also qualified for tax -exemption under section 501 (c) (4).13
Thus, unlike Bob Jones University, which brought suit to avoid tax
liability which would have resulted from revocation of its tax-exempt
status, Americans United based its action upon the claim that the revoca-
tion of its section 501 (c) (3) status would result in the loss of contribu-
tions from benefactors who would no longer be entitled to deductions
11. Section 501(a) of the Internal Revenue Code exempts certain organizations from
taxation, including those meeting the following description in section 501 (c) (3):
Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized
and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public
safety, literary, or educational purposes, or for the prevention of. cruelty
to children or animals, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the
benefit of any private shareholder or individual, no substantial part of the
activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting to
influence legislation, and which does not participate in, or intervene in
(including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political cam-
paign on behalf of any candidate for public office.
INrT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 501(c) (3).
12. Organizations devoting a "substantial part" of their activities to lobbying are
specifically excluded from the tax exemption afforded by section 501(c) (3). Incorporated
as "Protestants and Other Americans for the Separation of Church and State," Americans
United, Inc. supplemented its various non-profit educational activities with concerted
efforts to prevent the passage of federal legislation that would give government support
to parochial schools.
13. Like organizations defined in section 501 (c) (3), organizations meeting the follow-
ing requirements are exempted from taxation:
Civic leagues or organizations not organized for profit but operated ex-
clusively for the promotion of social welfare, or local associations of em-
ployees, the membership of which is limited to the employees of a designated
person or persons in a particular municipality, and the net earnings of which
are devoted exclusively to charitable, educational, or recreational purposes.
INr. REv. CoDE of 1954, § 501 (c) (4).
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under section 170.14 Two individual taxpayers joined as plaintiffs, com-
plaining of the threatened loss of tax deductions for contributions to the
organization.
The issue of the applicability of the anti-injunction statute was ulti-
mately decided in favor of Americans United but against Bob Jones
University. The cases are readily distinguishable; the action in Bob Jones
was characterized as a suit to restrain the government's assessment and
collection of a tax, thus raising the bar of section 7421 (a), while the
action in Americans United was brought primarily to preserve the tax
deductible status of contributions made to Americans United.
This Comment will examine these and related cases in developing the
argument that a suit, although brought against the government in its tax-
collecting capacity, may not be within the purview of section 7421 (a).
Integral to the discussion will be an examination of the limited exceptions
to the operation of section 7421 (a).
CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING APPLIcABILITY OF SECTION 7421 (a)
Applicability of section 7421 (a) requires that the government action
which is being challenged must involve the assessment or collection of a
tax and that the suit be one to restrain that assessment or collection.' 5
For most purposes, a "tax" has been defined as a rate or sum of money
assessed on the person or property of a citizen by the government for
the use of the nation or state.'6 Whether a particular levy is a tax gen-
erally has been determined on a case-by-case basis.17
Gravamen of the Action
Since Americans United was not threatened with loss of its tax-exempt
status, it argued that its suit was not one to enjoin the assessment or col-
14. Because the definition of tax-exempt organizations under section 501(c) (3) is
nearly identical to that of organizations to which contributions are deductible under
section 170(c) (2), loss of section 501(c) (3) status would automatically result in loss
of the benefits of section 170(c) (2). The same generally is not true of organizations
which are exempt from taxation only because they are within the provisions of section
501(c) (4).
15. See text accompanying note 8 supra.
16. Hamilton v. Dilhin, 11 F. Cas. 332, 335 (No. 5,979) (C.C.N.D. Tenn. 1871).
17. See, e.g., State v. Durupt, 148 F.2d 918 (8th Cir. 1945) (sums owing on former
landowner's contract of purchase fxom county after expiration of time of redemption
from tax sale); Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry. v. City of Randolph, 122 F. Supp. 302
(D. Neb. 1954) (special assessment levied by municipal corporation against railroad);
United States v. Cain, 113 F. Supp. 304 (S.D. Miss. 1953) (Self Employment Contri-
butions Act).
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lection of taxes but was designed to preserve the flow of contributions
to the corporation which might no longer be forthcoming were its sec-
tion 501 (c) (3) status terminated. The district court did not accept this
characterization of the complaint, holding that maintenance of the suit,
either by the individual or corporate plaintiffs, was barred by the anti-
injunction provisions of section 7421(a). While upholding the lower
court's decision as to the individual plaintiffs, the court of appeals re-
versed the determination that the action by the corporation was barred
by section 7421 (a).
In distinguishing the claims of the corporate and individual plaintiffs,
the court stated: "The corporation, alleging constitutional violations of
an identical nature to that of the individual appellants, irreparable injury
and an inadequate legal remedy..., does so in a posture removed from
a restraint on assessment or collection." 18 Judge Tamm, writing for the
court, concluded: "The restraint upon assessment and collection is at
best a collateral effect of the action, the primary design not being to re-
move the burden of taxation from those presently contributing but
rather to avoid the disposition of contributed funds away from the cor-
poration." 19 Thus, the court based its characterization of the suit upon
the corporation's "primary design" to preserve a flow of tax-deductible
contributions, holding immaterial any effect which such action might
have upon the tax liability of the contributors of Americans United.20
Implicit in Judge Tamm's refusal to accept the government's allega-
tion that the suit involved the assessment and collection of taxes was the
belief that if it is not clear that the government will incur a loss of reve-
nue if an injunction is granted and if the plaintiff has demonstrated
that failure to issue such injunction will cause it irreparable harm, section
7421 (a) should not apply to prohibit equitable relief. Thus, in Americans
United it was clear that under no circumstances would the corporate
plaintiff be subjected to increased tax liability as a result of loss of its
section 501 (c) (3) exemption; moreover, since there was no assurance
that its benefactors would continue to make contributions which would
not be tax-deductible, there was at most only a possibility that those con-
tributors would incur additional liability. When viewed from this per-
spective and in light of other equitable considerations in the case, the
holding that Americans United had established its jurisdictional claim
18. No. 71-1299 at 16 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 11, 1973).
19. Id. at 15-16.
20. The applicability of section 7421 (a) to a suit to enjoin assessment or collection of
the taxes of another is discussed at notes 28-33 infra & accompanying text.
[Vol. 14:10141018
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does not appear to conflict with the manifest purpose of the anti-injunc-
tion statute "to permit the United States to assess and collect taxes al-
leged to be due without judicial intervention, and to require that the
legal right to the disputed sums be determined in a suit for refund." 21
Penalties and Other Invalid Assessments
Even though it is conceded that a proposed government assessment is,
at least on its face, a tax, an attempt may be made to avoid the prohibi-
tions of section 7421 (a) on the theory that the government's action was
motivated by a purpose other than the collection of revenue. A dissent to
the court of appeals opinion in Bob Jones urged that section 7421 (a)
was inapplicable on grounds that the threatened revocation of the sec-
tion 501 (c) (3) exemption involved something more than the imposition
of tax liability. Stating that the "manifest purpose" of section 7421 (a) is
to assure the government of "prompt collection of its lawful revenue,"
the dissent continued:
However, the United States is not primarily concerned here with
the collection of revenue. The district court expressly found that
the "primary purpose" of the Treasury officials in threatening to
revoke the University's tax-exempt status and tax deductible bene-
fits to donors is not to assess and collect taxes, but through the use
of taxing powers "to require private educational and religious in-
stitutions to comply with certain political and social guidelines." 22
The majority of the court of appeals in Bob Jones rejected this argu-
ment for two reasons. First, there was no -evidence that the government's
motive in revoking the university's section 501(c) (3) status was to
punish it for its segregation policies. Moreover, many taxes have a con-
comitant "social" purpose, and courts generally have agreed that this
factor does not by itself preclude application of section 7421 (a) .23
Closely related to the argument that section 7421 (a) should not be
applicable where a proposed assessment has a "social" purpose is the
theory that section 7421 (a) should not bar a suit to enjoin the assessment
or collection of a tax which the government may not levy. There are
21. Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1, 7 (1962).
22. No. 72-1075 at 13, 14 (4th Cir. Jan. 19, 1973).
23. See, e.g., Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495 (1937); Bailey v.
George, 259 U.S. 16 (1922); Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884); Singleton v.
Mathis, 284 F.2d 616 (8th Cit. 1960).
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instances in which courts, by rejecting the government's contention that
the attempted exaction was a valid tax, have found section 7421 (a) inap-
plicable and granted an injunction.
In one group of cases, the refusal to apply the anti-injunction statute
was based upon a determination that an alleged tax operated as a penal-
ty.24 The Supreme Court in Lipke v. Lederer,25 after stating that the
assessment of a tax designed to punish the taxpayer must be preceded
by proper notice and an opportunity for a hearing, held that legislation
such as the anti-injunction statute may not be applied in a manner which
would deny an individual his constitutional rights.
Section 7421 (a) also has been held inapplicable where the alleged
liability results from an illegal exaction "in the guise of a tax." 28 For ex-
ample, in Miller v. Standard Nut Margarine Co.,27 a corporate taxpayer
sought to enjoin the imposition of an oleomargarine tax on its product.
Upon a finding that the government had issued interpretive rulings ex-
pressly stating that the taxpayer's product did not meet the definition of
oleomargarine, the Supreme Court granted an injunction.
Non-Taxpayer Status of Plaintiff
Prior to 1966, some courts had held that section 7421 (a) did not
foreclose suits in which the plaintiff sought to adjudicate questions un-
related to his own tax liability. For example, jurisdiction was taken in
suits to enjoin the voluntary payment of taxes by corporations28 and in
suits by property owners to enjoin the wrongful levy of their property
to pay another's taxes.29 However, the precedential value of these older
authorities is questionable in light of the 1966 amendment to section
7421 (a) prohibiting an injunction "by any person, whether or not such
person is the person against whom [the] tax was assessed." 10
24. Regal Drug Co. v. Wardell, 260 U.S. 386 (1922); Central of Ga. Ry. v. Wright,
207 U.S. 127 (1907). The Code provides, however, that a penalty for non-payment of a
tax is itself to be considered a tax. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, S 6671 (a). See also Shaw v.
United States, 331 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1964); Botta v. Scanlon, 314 F.2d 392 (2d Cir.
1963).
25. 259 U.S. 557 (1922).
26. Miller v. Standard Nut Margarine Co., 284 U.S. 498, 506 (1932).
27. 284 U.S. 498 (1932).
28. See, e.g., Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1 (1916); Pollock v. Farmers'
Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
29. Cf. Floyd v. United States, 361 F.2d 312 (4th Cir. 1966); Enterprises Unlimited,
Inc. v. Davis, 340 F.2d 472 (9th Cir. 1965); Maule Industries, Inc. v. Tomlinson, 244 F.2d
897 (5th Cir. 1957).
30. Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-719, Title 1, § 110(c), 80 Stat. 1144.
[Vol. 14:10141020
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To permit an action simply b'ecause the plaintiff is not the person
against whom the tax was assessed could result in frustration of the pur-
poses of the anti-injunction statute. This possibility was noted in a dis-
sent to the first decision permitting a stockholder to restrain the volun-
tary payment of a tax by a corporation: "[N]o form of expression can
conceal the fact that the real object of this suit is to prevent the collec-
tion of taxes imposed by Congress, notwithstanding the express statutory
requirement that 'no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or
collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court.' "31 Recognizing
this argument, many courts refused to permit suits by non-taxpayers
even before the 1966 amendment.32
The court of appeals in Americans United recognized that the non-
taxpayer status of the plaintiff was not dispositive of the jurisdictional
issue, stating: "We do not adopt the doctrine that section 7421(a) is
inapplicable as long as a party does not seek to restrain the collection
or assessment of its own taxes." 33
EQUITABLE CONSmERTIONS
If it is determined that a suit is within the purview of section 7421 (a),
such suit must be dismissed unless a court can satisfy itself that there are
equitable grounds for permitting an exception to the operation of the
statute. In Miller v. Standard Nut Margarine Co.,3 4 the Supreme Court
In McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448, 453 n.25 (D.D.C. 1972), the court stated
that the only purpose of the amendment was to prohibit injunctive suits by creditors
holding a lien on a taxpayer's property. However, in seeking the passage of the amend-
ment, the Treasury Department had stated:
Subsection (c) of section 110 of the bill amends section 7421(a) of the
code. That section presently prohibits injunctions against the assessment
or collection of tax. The cases decided under this provision raise a question
as to whether this prohibition applies against actions by persons other than
the taxpayer. New section 7426 will specifically allow actions by third
parties to enjoin the enforcement of a levy or sale of property. The
amendment to section 7421 makes clear that third parties may bring in-
junction suits only under the circumstances provided in new section 7426
(b) (1) of the code.
Hearings on the Federal Tax Liens Act Before the Ways and Means Conmnittee of the
House of Representatives, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., at 58 (1966).
31. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 612 (1895) (White, J., dis-
senting).
32. See, e.g., Corbus v. Alaska Treadwell Gold Mining Co, 187 U.S. 455 (1903);
Gardner v. Helvering, 83 F.2d 746 (D.C. Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 684 (1937).
33. No. 71-1299 at 17 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 11, 1973).
34. 284 U.S. 498 (1932).
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held that the predecessor of the present anti-injunction statute was mere-
ly declaratory of the equitable principle that an injunction may be
granted if the taxpayer can establish irreparable harm and the absence
of an adequate legal remedy. Thus, for many years it was held that the
statute could be avoided in "exceptional circumstances." 3s Then, in
Enoebs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co.,36 the Supreme Court
clarified the extent of the judicial exception to section 7421 (a), holding
that an injunction could be granted only if the taxpayer demonstrated
that under no circumstances could the government prevail 7 and that
irreparable harm would result from the denial of equitable relief.38
In Bob Jones, the court of appeals was not convinced that the gov-
ernment would have been absolutely unable to prevail in a test of its
action. On the contrary, since the Supreme Court in Green v. Connally39
recently had withdrawn tax-exempt status from a Mississippi segregation
academy because of that school's discriminatory practices, it appeared
possible that the university's first amendment argument would have been
rejected had the merits of the case ultimately been reached. Thus, failure
to meet the first part of the Enochs test precluded injunctive relief.
The court did, however, concede the university's argument that term-
ination of its section 501 (c) (3) tax-exempt status could result in irre-
35. Even before Miller, the Supreme Court had stated, without elaboration, that the
anti-injunction statute would not bar injunctions in cases involving an "extraordinary
and entirely exceptional circumstance" Dodge v. Osborn, 240 U.S. 118, 122 (1916). In
Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44 (1922), it was held that denial of equitable relief would
result in a multiplicity of suits. However, the Supreme Court later suggested that Hill
involved a penalty and that the refusal to apply the anti-injunction statute in that case
did not result from "exceptional circumstances:' Graham v. duPont, 262 U.S. 234 (1923).
36. 370 U.S. 1 (1962), noted in 61 MICH. L. Rav. 405 (1962).
37. Whether the government under no circumstances can prevail is to be determined
on the basis of the facts available to the government at the time of the suit with a
liberal view in favor of the government. Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co,
370 U.S. 1, 7 (1962).
38. Courts have employed divergent standards in determining whether the require-
ment of irreparable harm has been met. See, e.g., Midwest Haulers, Inc. v. Brady, 128
F.2d 496 (6th Cir. 1942) (destruction of business and intangible business assets was a
sufficiently special circumstance); Morton v. White, 174 F. Supp. 446 (EfD. Ill. 1959)
(loss of home, business and all worldly possessions was merely a hardship).
39. 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.), affd mem. sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997
(1971). After noting that the school's tax-exempt status was dependent on its being a
"charitable" institution, the district court examined the common law definition of
"charitable" and held that that definition did not include an institution which pursued
practices contrary to public policy. The court concluded that a segregated school was
not in the public interest and therefore could not be a "charitable" institution. See Note,
The Internal Revenue Code and Racial Discrimination, 72 COLUM. L. REv. 1215 (1972).
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parable injury. The university had emphasized that it not only would
incur tax liability but also would be removed from the list of organiza-
tions to which donors may make tax deductible contributions. The courts
have not agreed on the degree of harm necessary to constitute irreparable
harm under the Enochs test.4 For example, under circumstances similar
to those in Bob Jones, a federal district court in Green v. Kennedy41 held
that a potential loss of charitable contributions did not constitute irre-
parable injury, stating: "Some contributors may be deterred by the
doubt which this litigation casts on the deductibility of their contribu-
tion, but the schools are not entitled to have potential contributors kept
ignorant of the fact that serious questions about the validity of these
deductions have been raised." 42 A similar conclusion was reached in
Crenshaw County Private School Foundation v. Connally,43 in which an
injunction against the withdrawal of tax-exempt status from an Alabama
segregation academy was refused.
The basis of the decision in Green was that if the government's at-
tempt to withdraw tax-exempt status failed, the contributors would be
allowed a retroactive deduction for all gifts made during litigation. This
argument, however, overlooks the fact that potential contributors, fear-
ing that the university's action would fail, probably would withhold
their gifts until final disposition of the deductibility issue. Because or-
ganizations such as Bob Jones University depend on charitable contri-
butions for support, a temporary loss of their source of income clearly
could result in irreparable harm.
An important consideration in determining whether irreparable in-
jury will be suffered by the taxpayer whose suit is barred is the avail-
ability and adequacy of alternative remedies. Whatever taxes Bob Jones
University would have to pay while its claim was being litigated could
be recovered if it prevailed on the merits. It is unlikely, however, that
the university could recover all contributions lost while its tax-exempt
status was being determined. Nevertheless, the university would at least
have the opportunity for an adjudication of its substantive claims as soon
as it was served with a notice of deficiency." Additionally, by litigating
40. See note 38 supra.
41. 309 F. Supp. 1127 (DD.C.), appeal dismissed sub nom. Cannon v. Green, 398 Us.
956 (1970).
42. Id. at 1139.
43. 343 F. Supp. 495 (N.D. Ala. 1972).
44. See note 2 supra.
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its own claim for exempt status, it simultaneously would obtain an ad-
judication of the deductibility of contributions to its support.
Although it was determined that the action in Americans United was
not within the purview of section 7421 (a), it nevertheless was necessary
to find irreparable harm as a normal prerequisite to injunctive relief.
Moreover, a finding of irreparable harm, in the sense that a plaintiff
would not have alternative remedies should an injunction be denied, may
lend support to an argument that section 7421 (a) is not applicable in
the first instance. In McGlotten v. Connally,45 it was held that section
7421 (a) could not be used to deprive a plaintiff of his only remedy. The
court stated:
Plaintiff's action has nothing to do with the collection or assess-
ment of taxes. He does not contest the amount of his own tax,
nor does he seek to limit the amount of tax revenue collectible
by the United States. The preferred course of raising his objec-
tions in a suit for refund is not available. In this situation we can-
not read the statute to bar the present suit. To hold otherwise
would require the kind of ritualistic construction which the Su-
preme Court has repeatedly rejected .4
Similarly, since Americans United could claim a section 501 (c) (4)
exemption even if its section 501 (c) (3) status were terminated, it would
never incur a tax liability and thus would not be able to secure judicial
review through the traditional procedures. It is submitted that the ab-
sence of alternative remedies normally available in suits to restrain the
assessment or collection of taxes buttresses the holding of the court of
appeals that section 7421 (a) was not applicable to the action in Ameri-
cans United.
CONCLUSION
Although, as in Bob Jones, it often is clear that the purpose of a suit
is to restrain the assessment or collection of a tax, there are cases in which
the applicability of section 7421.(a) -requires closer- scrutiny. Thus, a
court should not defer to the characterization given a case by the In-
ternal Revenue Service, but should decide, as was -done in Americans
United, whether the suit actually involves the assessment or collection of
a tax.
45. 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972).
46. Id. at 453-54.
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Americans United and" Bob Jones indicate many of the factors which
may be decisive in determining whether section 7421(a) is a bar to a
taxpayer injunction suit. That the plaintiff is not the person against
whom the tax is assessed is not sufficient to avoid the application of the
statute. The statute may be avoided, however, if production of revenue
appears to be but an incidental effect of the government's action, par-
ticularly if the proposed assessment amounts to a penalty. Nevertheless,
application of the statute may not be avoided merely because the tax
involves a social purpose as well as a revenue producing purpose, so long
as the tax is not punitive in nature. Similarly, the statute is not rendered
inapplicable merely because of the alleged illegality or unconstitutional-
ity of the tax.
Examining the gravamen of the action is an appropriate means of de-
termining whether the purpose of section 7421 (a) would be dontravened
by issuance of an injunction. As a mixed question of law and fact, the
gravamen issue must be decided on a case-by-case basis. Support for the
conclusion that an action is not within the scope of the anti-injunction
statute may be found in the lack of alternative remedies. Although in-
adequacy of alternative remedies is not alone a sufficient basis for in-
voldng equitable principles in order to avoid the operation of the statute,
the complete absence of an alternative legal remedy may be strong indi-
cation that the action is outside the scope of the statute.
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